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In Florida, the interval between the time of the last survey1 and the
present has been good to the lawyer interested in cases involving contracts.
This is particularly true with reference to legislative developments. The
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,2 for example, marks the greatest advance
in the field of consumer protection in the history of Florida. The Act
reflects widespread dissatisfaction with abuses in installment consumer
selling and a legislative determination to enact comprehensive legislation
protecting the interests of the retail installment buyer. In taking this action,
Florida joins at least twenty-four other states in providing statutory regu-
lation on the subject of retail installment financing of motor vehicles.3
One of the great evils in installment buying has been the inclusion in
the sales contract of excessive service or interest charges, often labeled a
"time price differential." The Act curtails this unwholesome practice by
limiting such charges to specified rates.4 These statutory rates are com-
puted on a per annum basis on the cash sale price, less the down payment
or trade-in allowance, plus the cost of insurance, other benefits and official
fees.5
In an effort to protect the retail installment purchaser from contracting
away his remedies and rights, the Act specifically prohibits6 the inclusion
of certain provisions in the contract. Aside from that, the main features
of the Act are: (1) the requirements as to content of the retail installment
*Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law.
1. This is the third in the survey of Florida Law series and covers the legislation
enacted during the General and Special Session of the 1957 Florida Legislature and
the cases contained in volumes 81 So.2d through 95 So.2d as well as the applicable
corresponding reports of the federal courts for the past two year period.
2. FLA. STAT. § 520.01-520.13 (1957), added by Fla. Laws 1957, c. 57-799.
3. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2981-2982 (1950); COLO. RFV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-1
(1953); CON. GEM. STAT. vol.3, c. 311 (1949); lowA CoDE c. 322 (1958); Ky. REv.
T. C. 190 (1956); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 60 §§ 305-306 (1954), as amended, H.B.
993, App. May 1957; MD. ANN CODE art. 83, §§ 116-152 (1951); MAss. ANN. Laws c.
255, 11-iZA, 13H (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.628 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
168.66-168.77; NEB. REv. STAT. c. 60 § 617 (R,.R.S. 1943); NEv. STAT. c. 346 (1953);
N. J. REV. STAT. tit. 17, c. 16B (supp 1950); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw §§ 301-311; Onio
CODE ANN. §§ 6346.15-6346.27 (supp. 1952); ORE. Coms. LAws ANN. 42,401-42.426
(1940); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69 § 601 (supp. 1956); S.D. Sass. LAws c. 241 (1957);
VERNONS TEx. LAws c. 467 (1951); UTAH ConE. ANN. §§ 15-1-2a (1953)); VA. Cona
ANN. § 532 (1956); W.S.A. §§ 218.01-218.05 (1957).
4. See note 2 supra § 520.08.
5. Id. paragraphs (1) (2).
6. E.g., under the act, a retail installment buyer cannot waive a cause of action
for an illegal act committed in collecting payment or repossessing the vehicle. FLA. STAT.
§ 520.11(4)(1957).
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contracts; (2) the regulation of insurance practices, finance charges and
refund credits; (3) the penalty provisions of the Act. Unfortunately, it does
not contain a specific reference to civil remedies available to the seller on
a contract executed in violation of the Act. This is a significant ommission
and presents a problem that will have to be solved in the future when such
a contract is involved in an action by the seller for the return of a motor
vehicle, or an action by a buyer for return of the purchase price. However,
in light of the Act's obvious purpose to protect installment buyers and in
view of the general rule that a party will not be denied recovery, if he is
the party for whose protection the statute was enacted,7 it may well be that
the courts will hold that the execution of a contract, not in compliance with
the Act, is prohibited, but that the prohibition extends only to the seller.
The seller, thus, could neither enforce a non-complying contract nor prevent
its enforcement by the buyer.
It is hoped that a subsequent legislature will remedy the fact that the
Act, like the New York Law," provides that the buyer's signature shall be
conclusive proof of delivery to him of a properly completed writing.9
A new arbitration law, known as the Florida Arbitration Code,10 was
enacted in 1957. Under this Code, which was warranted by the impressive
industrial development in Florida, two or more parties may agree in writing
to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time
of the agreement. They may also include in a contract a provision for the
settlement by arbitration of any controversy thereafter arising between them
(relating to such contract) for any failure or refusal to perform the agree-
ment. Such a provision is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable without regard
to the justiciable character of the controversy. Of course, the Code does
not apply to any agreement in which the parties expressly state that the
provisions of the Code shall not apply.
The prior Florida arbitration statute" was substantially similar to the
English arbitration law12 of over two and a half centuries ago, and involved
a procedure far too rigid and much too formal for present-day practicalities.
Moreover, Florida's prior arbitration statute had little advantage, from a
7. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1540 (1951).
8. N.Y. PEARS. PROP. LAw §§ 30-31, added by N.Y. Laws 1956, c. 633.
9. FLA. STAT. § 520.07(6) (1957).
10. FLA. STAT. § 57.10-57.31 (1957), added by Fla. Laws 1957, c. 57-402.
11. FLA. STAT. § 57.01 (1957). Note, however, that Florida's unicameral Legislative
Council in 1828 enacted Florida's first arbitration law. Acts of the Legislative Council,
§ 9 (1828).
12. 9 & 10 Will, III, c. 15. (Repealed 52 7 53 Vict., c. 49, § 26 (1889).
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practical standpoint, over common law arbitration in that future dispute
provisions were not enforceable under the statute.13
The new Code embodies the fine points of the New York Act 4 with-
out incorporating its questionable 15 features. Compared to it, Florida's
Code is more clear and less complicated.
PARr II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
During the period covered by the Survey, no established Florida prece-
dent in the field of contracts has been expressly overruled, nor does any
case align itself with outmoded or discredited rules of other states.
Every case incluled in this Survey has beei selected because it repre-
sents the court's first announcement of Florida's postion on a particular
issue, or because the decision clarifies a point of earlier confusion, or because
the case provides an excellent illustration of important contract principles.
The case of Treister v. Pacetly' 6 involved the issue whether or not a
duly authorized attorney-in-fact can bind his principal by executing a con-
tract for the sale of realty in the name of the principal alone, without any
indication of the fact of agency upon the face of the instrument. On this
point, Florida had no precedent, and other jurisdictions are in conflict.
The rule with respect to a slightly different factual situation, where
reference to the fact of agency -appears in the instrument but execution is
accomplished by the agent's signing his principal's name alone, is definitely
to the effect that the principal will be bound.'7 These cases, as well as
numerous decisions sustaining liability upon negotiable instruments in these
circumstances, disclose that their rationale is fully applicable in the Treister
case, although, such cases may be factually distinguishable. 8 There is no
statutory basis for special classification of an instrument involving real prop-
erty in this type of factual situation' Accordingly, the Florida court adopted
the modem rule and held that as between the original parties and where
the recording acts are not involved, a contract executed in the name of the
principal by a duly authorized agent, acting within the scope of his authority,
is binding upon the principal even though the fact that the agent acted for
the principal is not apparent from the instrument itself. It should be noted
that this rule is commendable provided that there is no contention of fraud
in the particular case, and that the sole concern is with the validity of the
instrument vel non, as between the original parties who fully disclosed the
13. Steinhardt v. Consolidated Gro. Co., 80 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431 (1920).
14. N.Y. Cv. PRAc. ACT. §§ 1451, 1452, 1453, 1458, 1462.
15. Id. at §§ 1455, 1460.
16. 85 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1956).
17. 2 AM. ltul. Agency, § 247 (1936).
18. Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98, 33 N.V. 318 (1887); Tiger v. Britton
Land Co., 91 NEB. 433, 136 N.W. 46 (1912).
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fact of agency at the time of the execution of the contract, but did not
incorporate that fact into the written terms of the contract.
The Florida Statute of Frauds19 requires a memorandum to be "signed"
by the party to be charged or his agent. The general rule in the United
States is that the specific location of the signature to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds is immaterial and parol evidence is admissible to show the intent
to execute the entire memorandum. A recent Fifth Circuit case, Moritt V.
Fine,20 departs from this approach.
In the Moritt case, the facts involved an instrument, denominated
"deposit receipt," which acknowledged receipt of the deposit, and set forth
the terms of the sale of real estate. The instrument was signed "by Raymond
Asmar," the agent of the seller, in the place where the broker normally signs.
Following this, were two provisions: One signed by the buyer which stated
that he agreed to purchase the real estate and that he confirmed the contract;
the other provision, of a similar nature, followed immediately, but it was
not signed by the seller. The plaintiff buyer sought specific performance of
the contract. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a
claim. The court, which was affirmed on appeal, held that the agreement
did not satisfy the Florida Statute of Frauds" 1 as "Raymond Asmar's" signa-
ture merely acknowledged receipt of the money; he did not sign as de-
fendant's agent to sell.
This holding represents a conclusion that the nature of the signature
was unequivocal and that it could be determined from the face of the
instrument itself that the signature was not intended to authenticate the
whole instrument. The unique element in the majority opinion is that
although the agent's signature did appear on the instrument, the court dis-
posed of the Statute of Frauds issue on a motion to dismiss. This is the
most extreme position possible. However, it is acceptable in one sense,
and that is with reference to the theory that in acknowledging receipt of
the deposit money, the agent's signature had a separate legal effect-a
separate legal effect as to justify a conclusion that the signature was not
intended as a matter of law, to execute the entire instrument. The instant
case would have been wholly unacceptable had the signature on the instru-
ment not performed some distinct and separate legal function. If the Fifth
Circuit must depart from the general approach, let us hope that it notes
this distinction and restricts the rule of the instant case to factual situations
19. Fi. STAT. 725,01 (1957).
20. 242 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1957).
21. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1957).
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where the signature performs a separate legal function. May the Statute of
Frauds not be made one of trivial formalism.
The dissenting judge insisted that the statute requires only a "signing,"
and the signature of the agent did appear. Therefore, the dissenting judge
argues, since the nature of the signature was equivocal, parol evidence was
admissible to establish whether or not it was intended to authenticate the
entire instrument. If such be the situation, the case could not be disposed
of on the pleadings.
It is generally held that a contract is not void on grounds of public
policy unless it is injurious to the public or contravenes some settled
social interest. Although, it is fairly well settled in other jurisdictions,
22
until the case of Russell v. Martin,2 3 Florida had no case directly on
point. That is, the majority rule in the United States is that a common
carrier is ineffective to save itself contractually harmless fom its negligence
when acting as a common carrier, but that the rule is otherwise when a
carrier is acting in its private capacity.
The Russell case involved an agreement between a railroad and the
owner of a trailer park on adjoining premises, under which the railroad
authorized the owner to use certain crossings as private crossings, and the
owner consented to hold the railroad harmless from claims arising from
the use thereof. The Florida court adopted the rule (incorporating the
above mentioned distinction) well settled in most jurisdictions, and held
the agreement did not contravene public policy.
In two cases,2 the court clarified questions arising out of previous
decisions with reference as to when a document will be considered a
release and wlhen it will be labeled a covenant not to sue. The effect of
this distinction is especially significant in cases involving joint tort-feasors.
A covenant not to sue, as distinguished from an outright release of one
tort-feasor, would not have the effect of barring an action against the
other joint tort-feasor. Apart from a statutory provision to the contrary, a
release is an outright discharge or cancellation as to one or all of the
alleged joint wrongdoers. On the other hand, a covenant not to sue
recognizes that the liability or obligation continues, but the injured party
agrees not to assert any rights grounded thereon against a particular
22. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Atlantic Co., 66 Ca. App. 791, 19 S.E.2d 364 (1942);
MeNicholas Transfer Co. v. Penn. R.R., 154 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1946).
23. 88 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1956).
24. Alberts Shoes, Inc.. v. Crabtree Construction Co., 89 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1956);
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Boone, 85 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1956).
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covenantcc. The key to the whole problem is, that if the injured party
desires merely to execute a covenant not to sue, he should make the
covenant with and for the benefit of the particular joint tort-feasor only.
Thcsc abovc-mentioncd distinctions arc thoroughly acceptable from
a case-law basis in most jurisdictions. These rules would have continued
to apply to Florida agreements were it not for Florida Statutes, section
57.28(1) (1957), which provides:
A release or covenant not to sue as to one tort-feasor for
property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of
any person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability
of any other tort-feasor who may be liable for the same tort or
death.
The statute applies to all such agreements made in Florida after June
19, 1957.
Because of certain language in previous decisions25 many lawyers
deened it of some consequence if the signers of the documents signed
for themselves and "for their heirs and executors." Actually, however, these
words are not determinative of whether a specific document is a release
or a covenant not to sue, and they might appropriately be used in either
document. The pole star that guides the court's course in the interpretation
of these documents is the intent of the parties as expressed in the document
itself.
Alberts Shoes, Inc. v. Crabtree Construction Co.2 involved an action
for damages to a leasehold as a result of demolition operations conducted
on adjoining premises by defendant sub-contractor. In the instrument, the
lessee of the adjoining premises agreed not to sue the general contractor
or those for whose acts the contractor might be liable (for damages resulting
from demolition operations on premises adjacent to the leased building).
It was further agreed that in the event the lessee should release its claim
against the subcontractor, the lessee would execute a release to the con-
tractor. The court held this document evinced the intent of the parties
that the lessee's claim against the subcontractor should remain outstanding
after execution of the instrument. Hnce, it was a covenant not to sue
rather than a release. On the other hand, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company v. Boolne 2T involved a document that stated that "we covenant
to forever refrain from instituting, pressing, or in any way aiding any
claim, demand, action or cause of action, for damages, cost, loss of service,
expenses or compensation for, on account of, or in any way growing out of,
or hereafter to grow out of an accident." Thus, the "covenant" was com-
prehensive and all-inclusive. It was a "covenant to refrain" from suing
25. See, for example, Davidow v. Seyfarth, 58 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1952).
26. 89 So.2d 491 (Fl:. 1956).
27. 87 So.2d 834 (Fn. 1956).
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everybody connected with the particular injury. The court held that the
parties made the agreement not with and for the particular joint tort-feasor
alone, but with him and- for the benefit of everybody involved, and that,
therefore, it was a release.
While a release executed pursuant to a mistake, as to a past or
present fact, may be set aside, unexpected or unkown consequences of
known injuries will not result in invalidating the release. An erroneous
opinion respecting future conditions as a result of presently known facts
will not justify setting aside the release. The distinction involved here is
in accord with the policy of the law favoring amicable settlement of disputes
and the avoidance of litigation. If the rules were otherwise, no release could
be safely accepted in personal injury matters. This matter of concern to
Florida lawyers was involved in DeWitt v. Miami Transit.28 It involved a
tort victim who was injured as a result of the negligent operation of a
bus. She consulted physicians who after making examinations and x-rays
informed her that she had suffered an injury to her lower back. She then
executed a general release to the transit company in consideration of a
small amount of money to liquidate medical expenses. I-Ter suffering, how-
ever, continued. Further examinations showed the first estimate of harm
was incorrect. The doctor had failed to evaluate accurately, at the time
of the original examination, the ultimate product of the injury received.
She argued that a release executed under a mistake of an existing fact is
not effective. The court held the release could not be invalidated.
Of course, there had been no mistake as to the injury itself; the
mistake related to the ultimate consequences of the injury. If the rule
were otherwise, the end result would be that all such claims would be
forced into litigation.
Courts of equity as separate tribunals have ceased to exist in Florida.
Nevertheless, the demarcation between courts of equity and law and their
respective fields of operation are preserved.
In the final analysis, the difference between an action at law and
one in equity lics largely in the mode of relief granted. If the purpose
of the action is to recover a sun of money or damages, the action is clearly
one at law.29 On the other hand, a case of equitable only when some remedy
is sought which equity alone can give, or some right is claimed which
equity alone will recognize.
3
The case of Alegre v. Marine Motor Sales Corp.' 1 discusses the extent
to which distinctions between conunon law and equity, between legal and
28. 95 So.2d 898(Fla. 1957).
29. Central Florida Lumber v. Taylor-Moore Syndicate, 51 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1931).
30. American Cynamid Co. v. Wilson Fertilizer Co., 51 F.2d 665 5th Cir. 1931).
31. 228 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1956).
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equitable remedies, and between legal and equitable forms of action are
recognized. While the precise question presented by the Alegre case had
not been passed on by the Florida courts, the courts of other states,
3 2
which recognize the distinction between law and equity, have enforced
in common law actions the right of recission of a contract of sale con-
ditioned on the seller returning to the buyer the part of the purchase
price which he had paid. The majority of the court held the debtor
"conditionally" rescinded the contract, and that the recission did not
become fait accompli until two debtors paid the amount adjudged against
it. A strong dissenting opinion by Judge Jones insisted that the recission
was unconditional and became effective upon the giving of notice of
recission and that title to the vessel, if not therefore vested in the seller,
then became invested in him.
In a sale "f.o.b. the point of shipment," generally, the title in the
goods passes to the purchaser upon their delivery to the carrier. The
buyer's right to inspect and reject may be reserved by a specific contractual
provision or it may be conferred solely by operation of law, even though
the contract is silent on the particular point. In the latter case, the rationale
is that delivery to the carrier does not pass such an irrevocable title as to
preclude the buyer from refusing to accept the goods if they are not in
conformity with the contract. There is not much difference in legal con-
sequence between cases applying the general rule, which passes title subject
to the buyer's right to reject, and those cases adopting the doctrine of con-
ditional title. Even a specific rescrvation to inspect and reject is usually
insufficient to overcome the presumption that the parties intend title
to pass on delivery to the carrier. The established rule is that such title
is conditional on the buyer's right to inspect. Of course, if by the terms of
the contract and other evidence it is clear that the parties did not intend
title to pass until the buyer has had the opporunity to inspect the goods,
and the buyer does reject tle goods, title remains in the seller and an
action for damages may be maintained against him. Naturally, in this
situation, returning the goods does not effect a recission of the contract.
In McNeill v. Jack33 a seller sued for the price of some lumber de-
livered, and the buyer counterelaimed for damages incurred because of a
defect in quality discovered after delivery of the goods. The sales agreement
stated the. price as "f.o.b. cars at the seller's mill" and reserved the right
to inspect and reject the lumber at destination for defective quality. The
seller contended that the buyer assumed the risk of defective quality because
title passed when the lumber was delivered to the carrier. The court rejected
32. See Eagen Co. v. Johnson, 82 Ala. 233, 2 So. 302 (1887); Davis v. Ross,
45 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1950); 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 649 (Rev. ed. 1948).
33. 83 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1955).
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this argument and held that conditional title in the goods passed to the
buyer upon delivery to the carrier; the buyer upon discovering defective
quality could retain the goods, and suc for damages. This decision not only
protects the seller from unknown risk of loss while the goods are in transit
but also affords the buyer a remedy. The court's use of the term "conditional
title" adds little to the remedies of the buyer afforded by general warranty
principles in cases involving sales f.o.b. the shipping point.
Retention of the subject matter of a contract is not conclusive upon
the question where there is such an acceptance as terminates the right
to object. Not infrequently, it happens that the subject matter of the contract
is retained and used, because, under the exigencies of the case, the buyer
has no alternative. Although such retention or use requires him to make
compensation to the extent of the benefit actually received, it is not such
an acceptance as amounts to a waiver of the damages sustained because
of the imperfect performance. The court recently considered two cases, 4
on this point. In each of the cases, the buyer had received less than he
ordered, but more than nothing, and, therefore, these facts are worthy of
comparison with the McNeill case.
In Sax Enterprises v. David and Dash," a seller sought quantum
ineruit for bedspreads sold to defendant. The defendant denied owing
anything on the basis that the bedspreads ordered on specifications did
not meet the specification. The defendant having an urgent need for the
items, used them on a temporary basis, but promptly notified the plaintiff
that they were substandard. The plaintiffs claimed that such usage estopped
the defendant from cver denying an obligation to pay the full purchase
price thereof. The court held the buyer would not be cstopped, but
would be liable for the fair value of use. In Johnson v. Dichiara36 the
defendant had purchased an ice plant under a specification that it would
produce six tons of marketable ice per day, but- after installation and
testing, the plant would produce only three tons of marketable ice per
day. The seller demanded full price and the buyer refused to pay anything.
rhe court held the buyer liable for the fair value of the benefits received
by the defendants as of the date of surrender to the defendants less the
sum of $4,500 already paid on the contract; by "benefits" is meant what the
defendants gained; not what ihe plaintiff lost.
Although the case of Cook v. Adame-? is not monumental as a rule-
making precedent, it is nonetheless a refreshing case judged with sympa-
34. Sax Enterprises v. David and Dash, Inc., 92 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1957); Johnson v.
Dichiara, 84 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1955).
35. 92 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1957).
36. 84 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1955).
37. 89 So.Zd 6 (Fla. 1956).
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thetic kindness toward the plight of people of advanced vears.'Too often
they pledge their belongings and lands to others to take care of them
for the balance of life, and when the burden becomes onerous, the
pledgee attempts to welch on the bargain. The Florida court, in accordance
with the almost universally adopted rule, held that those so wronged may
resort to equity to cancel the deed and restore the property to the rightful
owner. The following words of Justice Terrell are quotable, and memorable
in their sympathetic understanding of the problem:
[Use of the words "shall provide"] "a home in the resilence on said
described premises during her lifetime and shall support and
maintain her in a comfortable manner suitable to her station in
life and as her needs designate," contemplates more than a few
wads of chewing gum and some tag ends of "hand-me-downs."
When one the age of appellee, or even younger, deeds to another
their valuables for a "home" and support as long as they shall
live, it is not satisfied by distant or silent treatment. It contem-
plates that which is symbolized in the old song, "Home Sweet
Home"; it means more than a shelter from the elements; it means
more than bread and butter, medicine, doctors' and nurses' care;
it contemplates those intangible relationships, such as comfort,
a right attitude, wholesome relationships; it may contemplate
forbearance, an effort to please, the exercise of patience, and good
fellowship not punctured too often with the barking of pet dogs
or the romping of rude youngsters.3 8
Mechanics' lien laws find sanction in the dictates of natural justice
and in the equitable principle that evcryone who, by his labor or materials,
has contributed to the prescrvation or enhancement of some other person's
property thereby acquires a right to compensation.'-"
In Greenblatt v. Gblditi" the court considered a home owncr's action
for a declaratory judgment respecting applicability and constitutionality of
a statute forming part of the mechanics' lien laws. The particular provision
involved was Florida Statutes, section 84.05 (11) (a) (1955):
If for any reason the owner fails to comply with the requirements
of this section, he shall be liable for, and the property improved
shall be subject to, a lien in the full amount of any and all out-
standing bills for labor, services, or materials furnished for such
improvement regardless of the time elements set forth in this
chapter.
This provision made no attempt (o establish the "direct lien" theory of
mechanics' liens: it imposed a personal and property liability independently
38, Id. at 7.
39. Jones v. Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 Fed. 370 (6th Cir. 1898).
40. 94 So.2d 355 (Fa. 1957).
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of the Mechanics' Lien" Law, for the full amount of all outstanding bills,
as a penalty against the unwary owner who failed to comply with the
other requirements of the Act. The court held the personal liability and
time element clauses void and unjustified under the mandate of section
22 of article XVI of the Florida Constitution, that "The Legislature shall
provide for giving to mechanics and laborers an adequate lien on the
subject matter of their labor." Moreover, the deletion of the penalty clause
carried with it the remainder of section 84.05 (1) (a) (1955), as the
clauses were an integral part of the sentence.
The court had a second opportunity to discuss the matter of mechanics'
liens in Anderson v. Sokolik.4' As a matter of fact, there was never a case
in which the doctrine of the statutory lien could be more appropriately
invoked than in the Anderson case. In Florida Statutes, chapter 84 (1955),
the legislature placed every safeguard to protect the economic security of
the "mechanic." The statutory lien was designed to cut off every defense
to payment and to provide summary process to convert labor or material
into bread and raiment. As justice Terrell said:42 "No court should invoke
what may be termed the process of judicial alchemy to transmute the bread
and raiment of the laborer and materialmen into stones and by the same
token transform it into gold for the userers." This attitude resulted in the
court holding that the Mechanics' Lien Act provision, "when an improve-
ment is made by a lessee, in accordance with a contract between such
lessee and his lessor, liens shall extend also to the interest of the lessor," 43
must be liberally construed to protect materialmen and laborers, whether
the lessee's obligation to build on property is express or implied.
Justice Drew, in a dissent, pointed out that there was no mention in
the lease of the size or kind of building to be erected, nor the cost
thereof, nor was there the first word in the lease which obligated the lessee
to build any structure whatever on the premises. justice Drew insisted
that the statute quoted above requires a contract between the lessor and
the lessee to make an improvement. However, the majority opinion by
Justice Terrell points out that the very purpose of equity and the statutory
mechanics' lien was to prevent hardships, similar to the ones involved in
the instant case, of the materialmen.
In yet another mechanics' lien case, Poranski v. Millings,44 the court
clearly announced that Florida adopts the "substantial performance rule."
The rule is applicable to building contracts where there has been sub-
stantial performance by the contractor and the owner refuses to pay the
contract price because of the failure of strict performance. Factually, the
Poranski case involved an action by a landowner to set aside the lien that
41. 88 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1956).
42. Id. at 515.
43. FLA. STAT. § 84.03 (7) (1957).
4. 82 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1955).
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a dredging company had placed on his land for filling services performed
under a contract. The company filed a counterclaim seeking to enforce
the lien. There had not been strict performance of the contract due to
errors of both parties.
An important procedural aspect of the Mechanics' Lien Law was
involved in Bybee v. Stearn45 which held, specifically, that a general con-
tractor was not an indispensable party to a suit by a plumbing subcon-
tractor against the property owner to foreclose a mechanics' lien acquired
and perfected under the statute.40 This holding is reasonable on the basis
that if the legislature had intended that a lienor not in privity with the
owner should join the contractor as a party defendant, it would have
been a simple matter to so provide. It did not do so, and it would be
judicial legislation for the court to read into the statute such a legislative
intent.
The case of Board v. Bay Harbour Islands47 involved an interpretation
of a restriction in a general town subdivision plan "against erection of
buildings other than residences, duplexes, and apartments." The question
was whether or not such restrictions vest in owners of other lands in the
subdivision, a property right for which compensation must be paid if such
lots are taken for the public use (such as the erection of a public school
building). The court held the owners were not entitled to compensation,
even though such public uses were inconsistent with uses to which the
lots were restricted by the private agreement.
Restrictions of the type quoted above do not fall within the category
of true easements, such as the right of use, passage, or rights of light,
air and view. "Easements" such as are involved in the instant case have
been defined as negative or equitable easements, and are, basically, not
easements in the strict sense of the word. They are more properly classified
as rights arising out of contract. The failure of some of the courts to
recognize this real difference has led to an "irreconcilable conflict in the
decisions."48 The courts are not in agreement as to whether such restrictions
are binding upon the acquiring authority when such lands are acquired
for a public use. The Florida Supreme Court in the present case insists
that the recent trend and the better view40 is that such restrictions convey
no interest in land, are not true easements, and at best, may be relied upon
and enforced between the parties thereto and their successors with notice.
45. 95 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1957).
46. FLA. STAT. §§ 84.01.84.35 (1957).
47. 81 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1955).
48. See note, 25 A.L.R.2d 904, 916, particulary at 918-919.
49.See 18 AMi. JUR., Eminent Domain, §§ 156-158; NictcLs, 2 EMI1NENT DOMAIN,
573 (3rd ed., 1950).
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'Were the court to recognize a right to compensation in such instances, it
would place upon the public an intolerable burden wholly out of proportion
to any conceivable benefits to those who might be entitled to compensation.
When an offer requests an act, and that act is performed, an inference
arises out of the offerce's assent to the offer. The assent being necessary
to the formation of a contract, howevcr, no such inference is possible when
the act was performed without knowledge of the offer. This latter rule
was applied in a recent offer of reward case in which the plaintiff furnished
the information leading to conviction of the criminal before the offers
of reward had been made. In Sumerel Y. Pindr 0O defendant offered a
$5,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of
the murderer of his wife. Earlier, plaintiff had given an F.B.I. agent the
serial.number of a pistol possessed by X, a crimihial, and it was this pistol
that X used in the murder. His conviction for the murder resulted from
this information. Plaintiff claimed the reward that was subsequently offered.
The court held for the defendant.
The decision is in keeping with the landmark case, Broadnax Y. Led-
better,5' although the Florida Supreme Court adds a whimsical requirement
of "meeting of the minds."
The court continued to use the nonsensical phrase "meeting of the
minds" in Florida Cartage Co. v, Tyler,52 in Estes v. Moylan, 3 and in
Hanover Realty Corp. v. Codoino. 4 As in the past, the court's usage of
the phrase was terminologically inexact." It is hoped that one fine day
the court will announce with clarity the objective test of manifestation of
mutual assent, which, of course, the court impliedly adopts.
50. 83 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1955).
51. 90 S.2d 692 (Fla. 1955).
52. 94 So.2d 362 (Ra. 1957).
53. 95 Sold 420 (Fla. 1957).
54. Hausler, Contracts, 8 MIAM.t L.Q. 283, 287 (1954).
